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Following the inconclusive result of the last general election, David Cameron made a ‘big, 
open and comprehensive offer’ to Nick Clegg to form a partnership government. Four days 
later, on 11 May 2010, Britain had its first peacetime coalition since the 1930s. Despite 
widespread predictions to the contrary, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government has 
survived for a full parliamentary term. While its period in office was marked by bitter 
disagreements over issues such as constitutional reform and Europe, it is equally clear that 
the two parties were able to work well together in other areas, notable among which are 
education and foreign policy. This raises a number of questions. Why did certain initiatives 
prove to be particularly contentious? Conversely, why was co-operation on other policies 
relatively straightforward? How did the two leaders seek to manage conflict within and 
between their respective parliamentary parties? What was the longer term impact of the 
Coalition on Britain’s constitutional arrangements?      
It was to address these questions that the contributors to this special section 
participated in a conference supported by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research 
Grant (award no: SG121411) and The Political Quarterly, which took place at Congress 
Centre, London in January 2015. As May’s general election looks set to be the most 
unpredictable in a generation, with a hung parliament seemingly the most likely outcome, the 
event also provided a timely opportunity to reflect on the experiences of the Cameron-Clegg 
government and to identify lessons for the partners in a future coalition. Given the damage 
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sustained by the Liberal Democrats during their time in government, it is unsurprising that 
most of these lessons are addressed to the smaller party (or indeed parties). More broadly, the 
articles explore some of the issues that will confront the next government whatever its 
composition, such as the future of the Union and the nature of Britain’s engagement with 
both Europe and the wider world.            
Three themes emerged from the conference, the first of which is the centrality of 
ideology in creating conflict and facilitating co-operation. Coalition governments bring 
together parties with different traditions and values, which in turn give rise to divergent goals 
and policy priorities. As a result, the partners need to find common ideological ground if they 
are to reach agreement and work effectively together. The extent to which they succeed in 
this will affect the coalition throughout its term of office, from the policy programme agreed 
at its formation to the passage of legislation through Parliament and, finally, the dissolution 
stage. For the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government, the ideological proximity of 
senior figures from both parties facilitated co-operation on the Coalition’s overarching goal 
of reducing the UK’s budget deficit, as well as on legislation such as the Fixed Term 
Parliaments Act (2011) and on the question of whether to intervene in Libya and Syria on 
humanitarian grounds.  
A second, related theme is that conflicts were more likely to occur within, rather than 
between, the Coalition’s constituent parties. This is largely attributable to the ideological gap 
between the two leaders and their parliamentary parties, and indeed the past five years have 
seen unprecedented levels of backbench rebellion. For the Conservatives, the divisions 
between modernisers and traditionalists, and between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptics, led to 
dissent on issues such as same-sex marriage and Britain’s relationship with the EU. These 
conflicts were exacerbated by a perception that the party leadership had made too many 
concessions to the Liberal Democrats, which caused considerable resentment among 
3 
 
Conservative MPs. Meanwhile, the ideological differences between Orange Book Liberal 
Democrats and the social democratic wing of the Party led to backbench disquiet about the 
leadership’s acceptance of the Conservatives’ deficit reduction strategy, and to parliamentary 
rebellions over, for instance, the trebling of university tuition fees and the Health and Social 
Care Bill. These examples highlight the need for the effective management of intra-party 
dissent, which in turn is critical to maintaining a leader’s authority and preserving coalition 
unity.  
The third theme emerging from these articles is the importance of differentiation. 
Although inter- and intra-party conflict is undoubtedly problematic for senior Coalition 
figures, it is clear that differences can be mobilised to promote unity and create a sense of 
shared purpose. This was a key function of the narrative of Britain’s ‘debt crisis’, which 
united the two parties behind the cause of deficit reduction while distinguishing their 
approach from the ‘fiscal incompetence’ of the previous Labour governments. Differentiation 
is also necessary for the preservation of the parties’ identities while they govern together. 
This concern is particularly acute for the junior partner, which may prioritise coalition unity 
over maintaining its distinctive identity. Motivated by a desire to prove that partnership 
government can work, the Liberal Democrat leadership pursued a strategy of co-operating 
with the Conservatives while endeavouring to keep conflict to a minimum. However, they 
would pay a heavy price for this decision in terms of influence, visibility and electoral appeal.      
My article shows how the common ideological ground between Conservative 
modernisers and Orange Book Liberal Democrats enabled the new government to create and 
project an image of unity. Drawing on the core values of their parties, David Cameron and 
Nick Clegg announced that the Coalition would be guided by the principles of freedom, 
fairness and responsibility in its mission to give Britain the strong, stable government it 
needed. Although the concept of fairness would soon be set aside, their shared belief in 
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freedom, responsibility and a small state enabled senior Coalition figures to develop a crisis 
narrative around Britain’s economic problems. This narrative fused party values with a 
construction of the ‘national interest’ and united Conservatives and Liberal Democrats behind 
the cause of deficit reduction, while differentiating them from the ‘irresponsible’ Labour 
Party that had allegedly caused the financial crisis. Through frequent repetition the narrative 
rapidly gained traction with the electorate, whose lingering doubts over Labour’s economic 
competence may well play a role in shaping the outcome of May’s general election.  
Coalition unity is vital at the formation stage, but there is a danger that the smaller 
party will become too closely identified with the senior partner and lose its electoral 
distinctiveness. Libby McEnhill demonstrates that this occurred in the area of welfare policy, 
where the Liberal Democrats sacrificed their commitment to social justice for the sake of 
government cohesion. She argues that the decision to place only one junior minister in the 
Department for Work and Pensions severely curtailed Liberal Democrat influence, making it 
difficult to distinguish the Party’s contribution. Although they attempted to assert their 
distinctive identity through a partial rejection of the ‘bedroom tax’ and by highlighting areas 
where they had restrained the Conservatives, these strategies failed to give a clear sense of 
what the Liberal Democrats stand for. Consequently, McEnhill proposes that the smaller 
party in a future UK multi-party government should invest in visibility, perhaps by adopting a 
‘depth’, rather than ‘breadth’, approach to the allocation of ministerial portfolios.  
The Liberal Democrats similarly struggled to exert an influence over the direction of 
the Coalition’s policy on Europe. Eunice Goes attributes this in part to their decision to 
pursue a ‘breadth’ strategy in the distribution of portfolios, but she also calls attention to 
Cameron’s difficult relationship with Conservative backbenchers. The ideological division 
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptics ensured that intra-party conflict predominated on this 
issue, which in turn was compounded by Cameron’s apparent lack of authority over his MPs. 
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In a bid to maintain coalition unity, the Liberal Democrats co-operated with the senior partner 
and sought to minimise disagreement with the parliamentary Conservative party. However, as 
Goes points out, this strategy again brought a loss of electoral distinctiveness. She therefore 
suggests that, if the general election produces another Conservative-led coalition, the Liberal 
Democrats should insist on controlling or sharing equally the portfolio with responsibility for 
renegotiating the UK’s terms of EU membership. This would enable them to increase their 
influence in such an important area, while preserving their distinctive identity.  
  In contrast, the sphere of foreign policy remained relatively free from coalition 
tensions. Timothy J. Oliver shows that while the Liberal Democrats have long been in favour 
of humanitarian intervention, it was only under Cameron’s leadership that the Conservatives 
adopted a pro-interventionist stance. The eruption of the Arab Spring in December 2010 
brought the two leaders’ interventionist impulses to the fore, and Oliver highlights the 
overlaps between Cameron and Clegg’s justifications for military action. These arguments 
emphasised the need to alleviate civilian suffering first in Libya and then in Syria, and 
contrasted the proposed interventions with the 2003 Iraq war. The two leaders thus sought to 
differentiate their approach from that of New Labour, and to rally the support of their parties 
for military action. While some backbenchers were critical of the arguments presented to 
them, few MPs from the three main parties objected to the principle of humanitarian 
intervention per se. So, whatever the outcome of the general election, intervention on 
humanitarian grounds is likely to feature on the foreign policy agenda of next government.    
Another issue with important implications for the next parliament is the constitutional 
future of the UK. In the wake of the ‘no’ vote in the Scottish independence referendum, 
Cameron announced that further devolution of competencies to Scotland must be 
accompanied by an answer to the West Lothian Question. This was an attempt to neutralise 
dissent among his backbenchers over the offer of devo-max, and it put the matter of English 
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votes for English laws firmly centre stage. In his article, Richard Hayton argues that the 
command paper containing proposals to address the West Lothian Question reflected not only 
a lack of agreement at the top of the Coalition, but also a diversity of opinion among 
Conservative MPs. For Hayton, this indicates that party management concerns have 
prevented the development of a coherent approach to the future of the constitution. 
Nonetheless, a cross-party consensus is emerging that the West Lothian Question must be 
answered, though in the short term the nature of this response is heavily dependent on the 
result of the forthcoming general election.   
These debates over the future of the Union challenge the majoritarian vision of 
democracy that predominates in the UK.  However, Oonagh Gay, Petra Schleiter and Valerie 
Belu contend that the Coalition itself has compounded this challenge with its amendments to 
the UK’s governing and constitutional conventions. Although the Coalition introduced 
machinery designed to facilitate inter-party bargaining and manage dissent, the need for the 
partners to co-operate has caused tensions within their parliamentary parties. In response to 
the new imperative for compromise, the party leaderships moved away from traditional 
majoritarian approaches to managing internal conflict and adopted a more negotiated 
strategy. A second important change is the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which gives 
Parliament a greater role in forming, sustaining and terminating governments. This again 
points towards a more participatory approach to governance that is founded on negotiation, 
and so further relaxes the UK’s majoritarian practices. Gay, Schleiter and Belu suggest that 
this trend will persist if the 2015 general election produces another hung parliament and that, 
should two-party politics continue to decline, pressure for a move towards a more 
proportional vision of democracy is likely to mount.   
Finally, Ben Yong and Tim Bale review the options available to Labour if it emerges 
from the general election as the largest party in a hung parliament. These are: a minority 
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government, either on its own or with at least one partner, or a majority coalition with another 
party (or parties). Given that the precedents for minority government in the UK are not 
encouraging, Yong and Bale argue that Labour should strive to form a majority coalition if 
the parliamentary arithmetic permits. After all, the Conservatives benefited substantially from 
their time in government with the Liberal Democrats, as they were able to command a 
majority in the House of Commons and implement many of their policies. Conversely, the 
impact of the junior partner was limited, both in government and in the eyes of the electorate, 
to the detriment of the Liberal Democrats’ electoral distinctiveness and popularity. On the 
basis of these considerations, Yong and Bale conclude that Labour’s best option is a majority 
coalition because, as the larger party, it can reap the benefits of public visibility and relatively 
stable government.     
Whatever the outcome of May’s general election, the experience of the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat government demonstrates that a hung parliament need not lead to political 
instability. It also shows that, despite initial scepticism, coalition government can work in the 
UK. This is important because it is becoming increasingly difficult for a single party to 
command a majority in the House of Commons, due to partisan dealignment, the growing 
public disillusionment with Labour and the Conservatives, and the rising popularity of 
smaller parties such as the Greens and UKIP. As such, it seems highly likely that the UK will 
have more coalition governments in the future. It is therefore hoped that the articles in this 
special section will offer useful lessons for subsequent coalitions, while enhancing 
understanding of the competing dynamics of conflict and co-operation at work within the 
Cameron-Clegg government. 
 
